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Introduction  
 
Scholarly and institutional literature on international competitiveness mainly uses countries’ net 
exports or current account balances as a measure of their competitiveness and/or economic 
soundness (following this template, here current account balance and net exports are used 
interchangeably). As such, mainstream economic research deems countries with higher current 
account balances more competitive than countries with lower net exports, arguing that such export 
success is to be achieved though lower export prices, wages, and unit labor costs. In line with the 
literature, most EU countries have progressively adopted decentralized wage-setting mechanisms.    
 
Economists point out Germany as an empirical example of the wonders that low unit labor 
costs can work on net exports, since the country has held the position of number one exporter in 
Europe for several years; they hold it as the golden standard for competitiveness in the EU, with 
international institutions designing German-inspired policy recommendations for a diverse group 
of nations. Some economists have pointed to labor market characteristics and decentralized wage-
setting mechanisms as the reasons accounting for Germany’s (and other nations’) export success 
(Dustmann et. al, 2014), which has led others to generalize decentralized wage bargaining as a 
one-size-fits-all solution to meager exports. The reasoning behind this rationale is that 
decentralized wage-setting leads to lower salaries, which in turn lower the costs of exported goods, 
making them more appealing to foreigners and raising the country’s trade balance and 
competitiveness.  
 
However, several problems arise in this analysis: 1) it is not clear that a country’s trade 
balance as opposed to other economic indicators is a good measure of its international 
competitiveness 2) Germany’s high exports cannot be justified solely on its labor market and 
wage-setting policies 3) Germany’s export success is not without its disadvantages both at national 
and EU level, and 4) some countries’ net exports have risen even after the implementation of 
centralized wage-setting mechanisms. Each of these observations is analyzed in this paper to 
conclude that 1) decentralized wage-setting systems are not incompatible with high net exports, 
Belgium being a case in point, as product quality, real exchange rates, investment incentives, and 
resistance to imports also affect current account balances and 2) given the subjective nature of the 
concept of competitiveness, it might be preferable for national governments to determine their 
policy-making agenda based on whichever definition of “international competitiveness” best fits 
their country’s needs, strengths, and values, instead of adopting other nations’ or mainstream 
competitiveness-oriented policies.    
 
An emphasis is put on Belgium as one of the few European countries to have adopted more 
centralized wage-setting mechanisms after the 2008 crisis and to have seen rising wages as well 
as rising net exports thereafter. The fact that Belgium moved against the present trend of 
progressive wage-setting decentralization makes the country one of those economic natural 
experiments which economists so anxiously await and deeply adore. The unusual character of such 
a move added to the fact that the country’s net exports increased, despite the predictions of 
conventional economic theory, make Belgium’s labor market much worthy of analysis.  
 
Section 1.0 The history of the concept “competitiveness” 
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International competitiveness has been viewed from two perspectives: a micro (competition among 
firms) and a macro (national) one. The latter is to be interpreted as a means to an end: raising 
citizens’ real income and standard of living, through investment, trade, and economic production, 
although international trade performance has been the main measure of international 
competitiveness. The macro definition of competitiveness has its origins in Ricardo’s theory of 
comparative advantage and Heckscher-Ohlin’s factor abundance theorem, whereby countries 
specialize in the production of goods they manufacture more efficiently and trade them for goods 
that other nations can produce more cheaply. In this view, relative prices are the only factor 
underlying trade flows, since a country’s comparative advantage in producing one good means it 
is able to export it at a price lower to that of its competitors. Later theories of international trade 
added a broad array of economic factors to Ricardo’s analysis, such as labor productivity, capital 
output ratio, research and development, differences in human capital, and real wages, giving rise 
to the new “neotechnology theories”. Given that the price of exports affects foreigners’ taste (or 
distaste) for such goods, and that labor costs affect this price greatly, it was argued that lower unit 
labor costs (UCL) would translate into cheaper and therefore larger exports. The consideration of 
an increasing number of economic variables in trade flows analysis generated a need for agreement 
on a measure of nations’ competitiveness, to facilitate cross-countries analysis among economists 
and institutions. After several proposals of economic indicators by research and financial 
institutions, relative unit labor costs were adopted as the standard measure of international 
competitiveness. Soon after, however, several economists concluded that variables concerning 
national industries, innovation, and a specific country’s socio-economic and political goals might 
be of greater importance in studies of international competitiveness (Waheeduzzaman and John K. 
Ryans Junior, 1996).  
 
Still, a great portion of contemporary scholarly economic literature defines 
competitiveness in terms of ULC and net exports. International institutions such as the ECB, the 
European Commission, and the IMF also refer to current account balances to measure a given 
country’s competitiveness in their publications. Indeed, a 2008 ECB report read: “Cumulative 
increases in labor costs across euro area countries can be indicative of growing imbalances and 
losses in competitiveness and, as such, are an important early sign of the need for adjustment. 
Relative developments in labor costs across the euro area countries, together with other indicators 
of competitiveness, have therefore to be closely monitored”. However, as mentioned before, some 
economists have formulated different yet not less valid definitions of competitiveness, some 
examples being Porter’s work on research, firm innovation, and knowledge creation (Porter 1990), 
and Reiljan, Hinrikus, Ivanov’s appeal to strategic government investment in underdeveloped 
socio-economic and equality of opportunities (Reiljan, Hinrikus, Ivanov, 2000). The 
aforementioned economists’ work deserves attention, because it underlines the fact that some 
countries might very well be extremely competitive while not being considered so under traditional 
economic views. In other words, there is room for economists, national governments, and 
international institutions to disagree on which definition of competitiveness fits a country’s 
specific conditions best without engaging in unfounded, unreasonable discourse. As such, their 
research results suggest that national governments must develop their own clear, idiosyncratic 
definition of competitiveness, so to: firstly, design intentional policy plans that fit their country’s 
economic conditions well, then identify those aspects of their country’s economy which are 
underdeveloped, and finally channel investment in those directions.  
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In his 1990 article The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Michael E. Porter argued that a 
nation’s competitiveness relies on the degree to which its industry will be able innovate, when 
challenged by other firms or economic conditions. In his view, “companies benefit from having 
strong domestic rivals, aggressive home-based suppliers, and demanding local customers”, 
because this forces them to upgrade (Porter, 1990). Under Porter’s definition of competitiveness, 
countries with negative trade balances but entrepreneurial business environments will be 
considered competitive. The U.S., for example, has been running fiscal deficits since 1970, except 
for 1998 to 2001, and holds the worlds’ highest current account deficit, but is widely considered 
one of the strongest economies today. In fact, very few would argue the U.S. is not competitive in 
the international arena. In line with Porter’s view on competitiveness, such could be justified by 
its unmatched technological and research development – the world’s biggest tech companies, such 
as Microsoft, Apple, and Intel are headquartered in Silicon Valley – and the incentives put in place 
to foster entrepreneurial, innovative activities, such as government distributed patents. 
Simultaneously, an “alternative” definition of competitiveness should not be employed as an easy 
way to justify reckless fiscal policy.  
 
In their work on competitiveness, economists Janno Reiljan, Maria Hinrikus, Anneli 
Ivanov argue that an optimal strategy to increase competitiveness needs to balance developmental 
aspects at a general, societal, industrial, and regional level. Their final recommendation for 
national governments is that when designing policies concerning each of these levels, they should 
decide whether to uniformize opportunities or invest more on relatively underdeveloped areas. 
This line of work on competitiveness argues that equality of opportunities and/or strategic 
government investment as well as a clearly defined political agenda for development are the basis 
for competitiveness. On this vein, one could argue that, for example, Northern European countries, 
with universal basic income and which have a differentiated investment agenda with more funds 
allocated to underdeveloped regions are more competitive than countries with stark regional and 
social differences in development levels. Nonetheless, some of these Northern countries, for 
instance Finland hold negative current accounts.  
 
Even a hypothetical consensus on competitiveness as net exports would not suffice to settle 
the age-old debate over international competitiveness, since there is also the question of exactly 
which price index captures export performance more accurately, which researchers have been 
pondering (e.g. 2006 Deutsche Bundesbank report The impact of alternative indicators 
of price competitiveness on real exports of goods and services). Divergences over the true 
definition of competitiveness are not restricted to economists, however, as European national 
governments’ views on the matter differ from those of international institutions such as the ECB, 
the European Commission, and the IMF. 
 
Since the 1980’s, European countries have followed a trend of decentralization of wage-
setting mechanisms, which has been accentuated by the 2008 financial crisis, with the ECB, the 
European Commission (EC), and the IMF including decentralization policies in their 
recommendation packages to EU nations (Eurofound report, 2014). Even when following the 
wage-bargaining decentralization policies designed by these international institutions, European 
national governments’ expectations about the effects of such policies do not align with the goals 
of the ECB, EC, and IMF.  
 
4
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 15 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/13
When interviewed by the Eurofound (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions), members of European national governments highlighted macro-
economic and micro-economic factors as well as recommendations or requirements from the 
European Commission and/or the ECB and/or the IMF as the main contributors to policy changes 
in wage-setting mechanisms after the 2008 financial crisis. Macro-economic factors pertain, for 
example wage moderation while micro-economic ones relate to the adaptability of firms.   
Export prices and trade balance are the macro-economic variables commonly used to make the 
argument that decentralization of wage-setting mechanisms increases competitiveness as well as 
the targets of decentralization policies designed by international institutions, because they rely on 
the traditional definition of competitiveness. So, one would expect correspondents to have claimed 
that macro-economic factors were a more important contributor to policy changes in wage-setting 
mechanisms than micro-economic goals. Nonetheless, out of the four national governments that 
reported state policies, recommendations, and requirements from the EC, ECB, and/or IMF 
influenced their wage-setting policy-making, only one country, Belgium, also reported being 
influenced by macro-economic factors, with most correspondents referring to micro-economic 
motivations for decentralization in wage bargaining.  
 
This incoherence could be attributed to the fact that governments believe their country will 
increase its competitiveness if national firms become more flexible and adapt more easily to 
changing market conditions, that is, through micro-economic competitiveness, whereas 
international institutions believe the same goal of international competitiveness can be achieved 
through the macro-economic channel of wage moderation and cheaper exports. Ironically, macro-
economic factors were reported to be influential in the two countries – Belgium and Finland – 
which have experienced centralization in wage-setting arrangements, precisely the opposite policy 
route that institutions relying on macro-economic arguments of competitiveness would 
recommend. Nonetheless, other national governments’ views on competitiveness seem to align 
well with those of international institutions. In Ireland, for example, the break-up of national 
bargaining was reported to have been motivated in part by macro-economic reasons (securing 
wage moderation).  
 
Ultimately, because the concept of competitiveness is political and subjective, it is up to 
each national government to establish priorities for effective economic investment and policy 
making based on its own considerations of which sectors or investment practices align best with 
their national goals and values. 
 
For clarity’s sake and given that this paper relies on data from European institutions, which 
mostly employ the traditional definition of competitiveness, here the term “competitiveness” 
relates to a country’s trade balance, unless otherwise specified. 
 
Section 1.1 Can the traditional definition of competitiveness be detrimental?  
 
Of course, besides the question of whether the traditional definition of competitiveness as net 
exports is theoretically correct, there is also the issue of whether pursuing policies based on it 
might actually weaken a country’s economy (rather than being neutral). In this spirit, a 2006 IMF 
country report analyzing Germany’s high trade balance (Exports and Domestic Demand in 
5
Pedro Fernandes: Belgium’s 2008 recentralization of wage-setting mechanisms
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2018
Germany: Has the Nexus been Altered by Globalization) raises the question of whether the 
country’s strong exports are actually a sign of structural weaknesses in its economy.  
 
Explicitly, the IMF report uses economist Sinn’s work to argue that Germany’s large 
current account surplus reflects internal economic weaknesses and the export of capital. Sinn’s 
thesis (paraphrased in the report) is that the move towards globalization represented a 
competitiveness shock to the German economy, but that due to labor market rigidities, wages were 
sluggish to respond and became high vis-à-vis foreign wages. Labor-intensive exporting sectors 
failed due to high labor costs and had to release excessive labor supply, causing German 
unemployment to rise. The freed-up labor was not absorbed in the services sector, because services 
wage costs were too high and labor mobility tends to be too low. In summary, “Because adjustment 
in the domestic labor market is drawn out, specialization in capital-intensive/exporting sectors 
overshoots, and investment and employment in domestic service-oriented sectors undershoots” 
(IMF report, 2006 citing Sinn 2006). As a result of globalization, firm capital largely moved abroad 
to be combined with less expensive foreign labor. So, in this view, Germany’s large current 
account surplus is a sign of insufficient conditions and incentives for investment in domestic non-
tradable sectors.   
 
To make the logical jump from this point to Germany’s high net exports, the IMF’s report 
implicitly leans on the three-panel diagram macroeconomic model, according to which higher net 
exports and a lower exchange rate mean higher net capital outflows (NCO) and lower domestic 
interest rates. Given that NCO equals net exports (euros of capital invested in the foreign country 
will be used to buy German products in euros), positive and high NCO implies by definition that 
institutions and/or households have a preference to invest capital abroad rather than domestically. 
Consequently, the criticism with which one may address the three-panel diagram is also to some 
extent valid for the rationale exposed on the IMF’s report. Thus, one counterargument to Sinn’s 
conclusion could be that German investments in foreign countries does not necessarily provoke 
higher exports: for example, consumer preferences might limit foreigners’ demand of German 
goods, regardless of German capital investments in that country. One other question to be raised 
is: if foreign wages are lower and if globalization increased German unemployment, decreasing 
the purchasing power of at least the unemployed why aren’t exports from those countries (imports 
from the German perspective) also cheaper and preferred by Germans? That is to ask: why wasn’t 
an increase in imports counterbalanced by Germany’s strong exports? (see section 4.0 for a brief 
overview of German imports resistance) 
 
It’s also worth drawing attention to the fact that even though high Germany’s high net 
exports are attributed to its low wages, the IMF report exposes the gap between higher German 
and lower foreign wages as the motor of their strong exports. This apparent paradox thus supports 
the view that the link between wages and exports is not as simple as European economic policy 
might wish it to be.   
 
 
Section 2.0 – The History of German labor market reforms 
 
As of 2017, Germany was Europe’s largest exporter, followed by France, and the Netherlands, 
with Italy taking fourth place, and is therefore held as the golden standard for competitiveness in 
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the EU. There, since 2005, unemployment rates have steadily decreased, and participation rates 
increased. Since 2011, labor compensation has increased moderately. Although the main economic 
indicators featured in the literature on Germany’s exceeding competitiveness are the country’s unit 
labor costs, export prices, and trade balance, for many years, the key challenge for Germany was 
to reduce high and persistent unemployment. Indeed, the continuous rise in unemployment until 
the mid-2000s, which earned Germany the nickname of “sick man of Europe” at the time, can 
clearly be seen in Figure 1. Germany’s route from the unemployment trap of the early 2000s to 
becoming an “economic superstar” has received global attention. Its labor market robustness to 
the impacts of the 2008 Great Recession (unemployment changed very little as a result of the crisis) 
has also caught policy-makers eye. It has therefore been argued that Germany could be a reference 
model for nations with labor market turmoil (Schneider and Rinne, 2017).  
 
Germany’s past unemployment rate has often been linked to high employment protection, 
high labor costs, and strictly regulated labor markets. In this context, the labor market reforms (the 
2003-2005 “Hartz reforms”) are considered to have played an important role in reducing 
unemployment. Under the reforms, flexible forms of employment such as fixed term contracts, 
temporary agency work, and marginal employment became more attractive, unemployment 
benefits duration for the elderly was lowered, and all welfare recipients considered able to work 
were included in activation schemes. Intermediate forms of unemployment compensation were 
abolished, and item-wise approved welfare payments were replaced by a monthly lump-sum, 
lowering unemployment benefits and making monitoring activities for the unemployed stricter. 
Hence, matching between unemployed workers and job vacancies accelerated. In conclusion, the 
labor market reforms successfully reduced unemployment by incentivizing job search, abolishing 
ineffective policy instruments such as job creation schemes, and enforcing the requirements for 
the unemployed to prove ongoing job search efforts. (Schneider and Rinne, 2017). 
 
Another factor which lowered Germany’s youth unemployment rates was the dual 
apprenticeship system, which besides providing skills and qualifications in demand, also reduced 
facilitated school-to-work transitions. Increased participation rates among older workers, mainly 
triggered by the labor market reforms, which effectively reduced monetary incentives for early 
retirement also contributed to decrease unemployment. Moreover, unions and employers 
increasingly used the collective bargaining process to arrive at more flexible labor arrangements 
via opening clauses in contracts between unions and employers’ associations, which were valid 
during financial crisis (Schneider and Rinne, 2017). 
 
Currently, the German system of industrial relations is laid out in contracts and mutual 
agreements between trade unions, employer associations, and works councils - the worker 
representatives who are typically present in medium-sized and large firms (Dustmann, 
Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener, 2014). In Germany, wage-setting is quite decentralized, 
with contractual agreements on wages, wage floors, and working time between unions and 
employers being periodically negotiated on the region-industry or firm level, without government 
interference. In fact, Germany had had no minimum wage imposed by the political process until 
2015. Consequently, as Dustmann et. al argue, “negotiations are usually far more consensus-based 
and less confrontational than in other countries. For example, Germany lost on average 11 days of 
work each year per 1,000 employees by strikes and lock-outs between 1991 and 1999, but only 
five days per 1,000 employees between 2000 and 2007. These figures for the earlier and later time 
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period compare to 40 and 32 
days per 1,000 employees in 
the United States, 30 and 30 
days in the United Kingdom, 
73 and 103 days in France, 
158 and 93 days in Italy, and 
220 and 164 days in Canada 
(Dustmann et. al 2014 citing 
Lesch 2009)” (Dustmann, 
Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and 
Spitz-Oener, 2014). 
 
A distinguishing feature of 
German labor markets are the 
opening clauses in 
employment contracts 
introduced by the Kratz 
reforms. Indeed, even within 
industry level union wage 
contracts, “opening” or 
“hardship” clauses allow for 
wage renegotiation at the firm level in times of financial distress, provided that workers’ 
representatives agree. Such clauses also mean that German firms can choose whether or not to 
recognize a given trade union as well as union’s wage bargaining contracts. Furthermore, German 
firms that recognized union contracts in the past can opt out at their own discretion. In summary, 
such policies allow for the possibility of wage renegotiations or layoffs during financial turmoil, 
increasing firm adaptability to changing economic conditions.  
 
Germany’s labor market has increasingly moved from industry or region level wage bargaining to 
firm-level negotiations, that is towards decentralized wage-setting, as from 1995 to 2008, the share 
of employees covered by industry-wide agreements fell from 75 to 56 percent, while the share 
covered by firm-level agreements fell from 10.5 to 9 percent (Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Schönberg, 
and Spitz-Oener, 2014). Dustmann et al. attribute Germany’s evolution in the direction of more 
flexible labor markets and decentralized wage-setting to the German reunification and to 
globalization. Their argument is that Eastern migration exerted downward pressure on wages and 
that the opportunity to move production abroad (which globalization generated) discouraged 
German firms to pay high union wages. Firms’ disincentives to pay high wages forced unions 
and/or works councils to become willing to negotiate pay rates directly with companies and to 
accept deviations from industry-wide labor agreements, which often translated into lower wages 
for workers. 
 
Section 2.1 – A reflection on Germany’s unemployment reduction miracle 
 
Germany’s move towards increased labor market flexibility and decentralized wage-bargaining 
seems to have succeeded in reducing unemployment via the Kratz reforms, the government’s goal. 
In my view, such results were achieved, because, from the unemployed workers’ perspective, the 
Fig 1. Germany’s unemployed workers, 1970-2016 source: Schneider and 
Rinne, 2017 
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reforms substantially lowered unemployment benefits, incentivizing job search. From the 
perspective of the firms, the reforms allowed for companies to both layoff but also hire workers 
quicker, increasing the speed at which matching between unemployed workers and jobs took place. 
Additionally, the fact that companies can recognize union wage-contracts at their own discretion 
effectively constitutes a significant transfer of power from employees to firms, since it often forces 
workers to accept lower wages, which reduces production costs and could increase firms’ profits 
or decrease the final price of the goods they produce. A causal link between such reforms and 
Germany’s export success via cheaper exports, however, is not by any means clear, since it is 
possible that German firms chose to add on the difference between the older, higher wages and the 
later, lower ones to their profits instead of lowering their exportable products’ prices. Note that 
lower export prices are required for traditional views of competitiveness as cheap and abundant 
exports to hold. Germany’s superior export performance could be due to other factors entirely. 
Moreover, one could argue that lower wages reduce households’ purchasing power, which can 
hurt firms’ profits, given that, according to a Keynesian view of the world, such reduces aggregate 
demand, slowing down economic growth (despite also reducing imports along with demand for 
other goods). Nonetheless, advocates of wage-setting decentralization have used Germany’s labor 
market evolution to argue that such systems are superior to centralized ones. I believe the 
conclusion that Germany’s decentralized wage-setting is the reason behind its strong exports is 
erroneous. In my view, it ultimately stems from the fact that institutions such as the IMF, the ECB 
or the EC have not been able to identify the mismatch between the target economic variable of the 
Kratz reforms which they copy to a certain extent (unemployment) and the target of their wage-
decentralization policy recommendations (exports). Recommending German-style reforms to 
other governments, erroneously treating such policy packages as one-size-fits-all, can be 
problematic, because implementing the same labor market policies in economic environments 
different from the one where those policies succeeded and in order to reach a goal different from 
the one its original designers had in mind is not only incoherent but also likely to lead to 
unexpected outcomes.  
 
Similarly, as mentioned in section 1.0, national governments also implement international 
institutions’ policy recommendations expecting to achieve micro-economic goals while the policy 
designers at those institutions wrote them with a macro-economic mindset. If such goals cannot be 
achieved simultaneously, this divergence most likely will lead to disappointment from either 
party’s side (whoever fails to reach its objective) and successive changes in policies.        
 
 
Section 3.0 The wage-setting mechanisms – ULC – exports connection 
 
Decentralization of wage-setting mechanisms is widely associated with lower unit labor costs and 
consequently cheaper exports and a stronger trade balance, so much so that after the financial crisis 
of 2008, a great number of European countries shifted their wage-setting mechanisms towards 
more decentralized ones, in an attempt to become more competitive. As we read in a 2014 report 
from Eurofound: “The prevalence of decentralization since the onset of the crisis continues and 
has accelerated; it is the predominant tendency in the evolution of wage setting mechanisms 
observed since the late 1980s.” However, other economists have argued that the link between 
wage-setting mechanisms, unit labor costs, and exports is actually weak. In this section, I present 
an overview of the literature on the decentralization-ULC-exports connection.  
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 The traditional economic view on the ULC-exports link is that globalization and its 
associated increase in international competitiveness have made exports more sensitive to costs. 
Thus, “the focus on unit labor costs as a measure for competitiveness is based on the idea that 
increases in unit labor costs are passed on in the form of higher export prices, resulting in a 
deterioration in the balance of payments, hampering economic growth and increasing 
unemployment” (Decramer, Fuss, Konings, 2016).  
 
In the specific case of Germany, while some economists argue that the Kratz reforms played a role 
in increasing the country’s exports, as mentioned in the previous section, German economist 
Christian Dustmann et al. makes the argument that the reforms succeeded in creating incentives 
for seeking employment but “did little to support the remarkable wage restraint witnessed since 
the mid 1990s, which is the key factor in explaining the gain in competitiveness” (Dustmann, 
Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener, 2014).   
 
Instead, Dustmann et al. argue that proximity of labor unions to firms and flexible, decentralized 
wage and labor contract negotiations are the true reasons behind Germany’s export success. The 
specific structural parameters of German industrial relations, they argue, allowed for an 
unprecedented decentralization of the wage setting process, leading to a decrease in real wages, 
especially at the lower end of the wage distribution. The sharp decline in the share of workers 
covered by union agreements and the increase in opening clauses that strengthened the role of 
firm-based works councils in wage determination relative to trade unions, they argue, contributed 
to this development. 
 
Apparently contrary to this view, data from the IMF and the ECB show that German unit 
labor costs had been rising even before the 2008 financial crisis. A perplexing fact indeed: how 
does Germany manage to keep number one place as Europe’s biggest exporter while its ULC and 
export prices increase? Dustmann et al. explain this observation, by analyzing the evolution of 
ULC across separate sectors individually, namely non-tradable sectors, tradable manufacturing, 
tradable services. The IMF and ECB, on the contrary, account for the evolution of wages across 
all sectors without cross-sector distinctions. The graphs in figure 2 show that, while German wages 
in tradable manufacturing have increased since 1990, wages in non-tradable sectors and tradable 
services have decreased since 1998 and 2004, respectively. Dustmann et al. use these results to 
explain why German exports have remained competitive even after wages in some sectors 
increased. The value added to exported products in manufacturing, they argue, is only roughly 
one-third of the value of the end product, with the remainder value coming from other industries’ 
inputs (domestic or foreign). So, the manufacturing sector benefited from low wages in other 
domestic sectors, namely domestically provided non-tradable and especially tradable services, 
where real wages fell between 1995 and 2007, as well as from cheap imports (production inputs) 
from abroad. Dustmann et. al further argue that Germany’s manufacturing sector may have 
experienced increases in productivity which exceeded the increases in wages in the manufacturing 
sector, since productivity increases in the manufacturing sector have exceeded the increases in the 
two other sectors. 
 
In Germany, the manufacturing sector comprised 21.6 percent of all jobs in 1995, but 17.7 
percent of all jobs in 2007, while the value added of this sector (in current prices) remained 
10
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 15 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/13
essentially unchanged at 22.8 percent of all value added in 1995 compared with 22.7 percent of 
value added in 2007 (Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener, 2014). So, the 
manufacturing sector must rely to an increasing extent on inputs from other domestic sectors and 
on imported inputs, because the share in final products has increased while the share in value added 
has remained the same. Finally, to increase the competitiveness of its own fiscal products, the 
manufacturing sector has made increased use of trade integration with Eastern European countries 
through inputs imported from abroad, more so than other European countries. These inputs made 
up 14.5 percent of total output in the manufacturing sector in 1995 and 21.5 percent in 2007 
(Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener, 2014). 
 
As such, in this view, Germany’s rising unit labor costs are not a counterargument to the 
traditional link between low ULC and higher trade balances (and competitiveness), but more so an 
expression of imperfect data representation.   
 
Nonetheless, in an entirely opposite vein, as early as the 1970s, Kaldor (1978) 
demonstrated that countries with the highest growth rates in GDP also tend to have increasing unit 
labor costs, which is known as the ‘Kaldor paradox’ (Decramer, Fuss, Konings, 2016).  
 
Similarly, Decramer, Fuss, and Konings, in their 2016 study of Belgium firms’ exports 
reactions to changes in ULC, found that the elasticity of exports with regard to unit labor costs 
varies between 0.29 and 0.40. Moreover, this elasticity differs across sectors and firms, with more 
labor-intensive firms being more sensitive to changes in unit labor costs than firms that use more 
capital and export mainly to the EU market. The financial and economic crisis affected exports, 
but the elasticity of exports with respect to unit labor costs did not change (Decramer, Fuss, 
Konings, 2016). 
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 The economists concluded that while their results show that unit labor costs have an impact 
on the intensive and extensive margin of firm-level exports, the impact is rather low for the average 
exporting firm. This suggests that pass-through of changes in labor costs into prices is low or that 
demand is fairly inelastic with regard to prices, which indicates that other factors such as taste and 
quality may be just as important to incorporate into indicators of competitiveness, as suggested by  
recent trade models focusing on quality and taste parameters. Also, the finding that the elasticity 
of exports with regard to unit labor costs is larger for labor-intensive firms suggest that cost 
competitiveness is more important for these firms (Decramer, Fuss, Konings, 2016). 
 
 
Section 3.1 The wage setting – ULC – exports link – Belgium as a counterexample to 
mainstream economic competitiveness theory    
 
From 
the 12 
countries in the aforementioned Eurofound report for which the dominant tendency from 2008-
2011 was decentralization of wage-setting mechanisms, the prevalent regime shifted from single- 
to multi-employer bargaining (recentralization) in two countries: Belgium and Finland. Whereas 
Finland’s trade balance decreased from 2008-2011, corroborating the common view that 
centralized wage bargaining hurts exports, Belgium’s current account increased after 
recentralization (according to data from the IMF). Belgium’s trade balance evolution from 2008 is 
therefore an interesting counterexample supporting this paper’s argument that there are aspects 
other than wage-setting mechanisms contributing to a country’s net export level.   
Fig 2. Germany’s real wages evolution, from 1990-2008, across nontradable sectors and tradable manufacturing 
and services; source: Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener, 2014 
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 Although data from the IMF and the ECB show that, similar to Germany, Belgium’s ULC 
have risen since after the 2008 financial crisis, as Dustmann et al. have implicitly argued in their 
aforementioned research, such does not provide enough information on the evolution of Belgian 
wages for one to conclude that there is no link between Belgian ULC and exports with confidence. 
I have therefore translated labor market data from the National Bank of Belgium and plotted the 
graphs in figures three through five, which reflect the evolution of nominal wages across non-
tradable sectors and tradable manufacturing and services in the country from 2000-2017. The 
method employed here is similar to that employed in Dustmann’s paper, to allow for comparisons 
between German and Belgian data, but it is nonetheless inferior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As in Dustmann’s paper, tradable manufacturing consists of manufacturing sectors for 
which the export base is above the 25th percentile of Belgium’s total export volume while exports 
of non-tradable sectors are below this threshold. In contrast, tradable services are not computed, 
due to a lack of information on the export percentage of specific services. Instead, the wage 
evolution across all tradable services is included. Inflation-adjusted real wages are shown and the 
data dates from 2000 to 2017 (instead of indexed wage growth from 1990 to 2008 as in Dustmann’s 
paper). Since I 
could not 
collect enough 
Fig 3. Belgian real wage evolution, from 2000-2017 in tradable manufacturing sectors and specified by wage 
percentile; constructed using data from the National Bank of Belgium 
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information on manufacturing labor productivity to draft conclusions on Belgian unit labor costs 
accurately, the graphs that follow only allow for wage evolution comparisons in Belgium versus 
Germany. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5. Belgian real wage evolution, from 2000-2017 in services (all levels of total national export base) and 
specified by wage percentile; constructed using data from the National Bank of Belgium 
 
Fig 4. Belgian real wage evolution, from 2000-2017 in non-tradable sectors (bellow the 25th percentile 
of total national export base) and specified by wage percentile; constructed using data from the 
National Bank of Belgium 
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According to data from the National Bank of Belgium and unlike the German pay rates 
featured in Dustmann’s paper, Belgian real wages across all sectors and the 15th, 50th and 85th 
percentiles have increased from 2000 to 2017. There are, thus, several conclusions to be drawn 
from the graphs above. Firstly, the fact that wages had been following an upward trend since before 
the 2008 wage-setting recentralization implies that more decentralized wage-setting systems do 
not necessarily mean lower real wages and ULC; such also means that recentralization does not 
imply higher wages and ULC. Secondly, because Belgian real wages have increased across 
services and nontradable sectors, Dustmann’s conclusion that product costs of tradable 
manufacturing can decrease due to the lower labor costs of those sectors that supply inputs to 
tradable manufacturing does not apply to Belgium.   
 
Note that only the evolution of real wages is analyzed here and that unit labor costs, that is 
considerations of both wages and the evolution of labor productivity in Belgium are not made. 
Ultimately, since both real wages and exports have increased after Belgium’s 2008 shift towards 
recentralization, we can conclude that Belgian data contradicts the conventional wage-setting 
mechanisms-wages-net exports link. As for the unit labor costs – net exports link, the graphs above 
cannot be employed to fully support or contradict conventional economic theories. Nonetheless, 
the aforementioned data on Belgium corroborates the view that policy recommendations for 
increased decentralized wage-setting systems which rely on the argument that such mechanisms 
will increase exports and competitiveness are flawed, their results depending on country-specific 
characteristics.  
 
One could argue that even though Belgian export levels have increased, they are still lower 
than those of Germany (one could also argue Belgium is a smaller country, etc.) and that German 
(more decentralized) labor markets are therefore superior. However, these arguments very 
philosophically lead us back to the “what is competition?” question from the beginning of this read 
by begging the question: with whom/what is each country competing: their own past export 
performance or that of other countries? Those who answer “the former” will probably react 
positively to the evolution of Belgium’s export levels and its 2008 wage-setting recentralization. 
Those answering the later are more likely to argue that Belgium’s turn towards recentralization 
has not succeeded in significantly boosting its competitiveness. 
 
Section 4.0 What other factors influence export performance?  
 
The data and arguments presented in the previous sections should lean even those at the higher 
end of the stubbornness distribution to agreeing that several factors other than ULCs determine the 
attractiveness of a given country’s exports. Indeed, parameters, such as product quality, real 
exchange rates, rising global demand, variations in the business cycle, and resistance to imports 
also play an important role in explaining the evolution of countries’ net exports. 
 
  In 2005, the IMF published the report Explaining Differences in External Sector 
Performance Among Large Euro Area Countries, which analyzed the evolution of the traditional 
determinants of exports and imports during 2001-2004 in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The 
publication concluded that the countries’ imports are well explained by domestic and foreign 
demand for said imports, while competitiveness across different imported goods played is not as 
relevant. All countries’ export levels rose due to rising global demand (globalization and the 
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opening of foreign markets), with Spain profiting the most and France the least. Similarly, all 
countries experienced real exchange rate appreciation, with Italy suffering the most (its exports 
became more expensive to foreigners and therefore decreased) and Germany the least. The report 
refers to an “unexplained part of exports”, which was positive for Germany and negative for the 
other three countries.  
 
As such, not only does the above IMF report indicate that big European countries’ exports 
are affected by factors other than ULC, but that German exports in particular seem to be preferred 
to other nation’s goods. A reason for foreigners’ preferential taste for German products could be 
the higher quality of their products. Indeed, on their 2014 study on France and Germany’s import 
demand (resistance) Thanagopal and Le Mouel test this hypothesis by comparing the ability of 
France and Germany to resist foreign competition. After a comparison of French and German 
products’ reality quality and prices, they conclude that German products (especially in sectors 
producing highly differentiated products) employ better competitive practices than French ones, 
because they tend to be less substitutable and highly differentiated vis-à-vis their foreign 
counterparts (Thanagopal and Le Mouel, 2014). These results point towards product differentiation 
as the key to strong exports and suggest that policy-makers should encourage enterprises to invest 
in technology, research, and higher-quality inputs to entice foreigners’ appetite for their products.  
 
 
Section 5.0 How do differential ULC and net exports across Europe affect the EMU?  
 
Economic research on the influence of cost competitiveness on national growth has been partly 
triggered by ongoing debates about growing imbalances in the euro area as these are attributed to 
negative current accounts in economically weaker countries in opposition to large positive ones in 
stronger European economies. Some economists have even gone as far as arguing that Germany, 
as the largest economy in the EU, has the responsibility to purposely raise its ULC to correct such 
imbalances.  
 
Under the EMU, each individual member state must attempt to meet the ECB’s inflation 
target of close to but below 2%. However, meeting a common inflation target entails constraints 
which can be detrimental to member countries, some of which related to the evolution of labor 
costs, because these are important in determining the inflation rate. The increase in European ULC 
should have been compatible with the EU’s inflation target. Instead, during the past 11 years a 
group of countries in the euro area has reported unit labor cost increases close to the EMU average 
- Finland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria. By contrast, Germany’s average unit 
labor cost increase - merely 0.6% - is far below from the ECB’s target. At the same time, the 
evolution of ULC (which have been significantly corrected) in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland and 
Spain constituted relevant upward deviations from the euro area average until the onset of the 2008 
crisis (Niechoj, Stein, Stephan, and Zwiener, 2011).  
 
As Torsten Niechoj, Ulrike Stein, Sabine Stephan, and Rudolf Zwiener’s conclude in their 
2011 paper German labour costs: A source of instability in the euro area: “It is not sufficient for 
the respective countries to reach the low unit labor cost growth of Germany, as this would not help 
to improve the domestic competitiveness vis-á-vis Germany… Preserving the European Monetary 
Union in its current composition and avoiding a transfer union, is only possible, if wage inflation 
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in Germany exceeds 2 % for several years”. The aforementioned economists seem to thus belong 
to the group of advocates for uniform ULC in the EMU at the expense of higher German wages. 
Despite the fact that policy recommendations towards greater equality of ULC in Europe differ 
there seems to be a broad agreement that unequal labor costs across the EU are one source of 
economic inequalities in the union and that measures should be taken in order reduce such 
differences.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Given that a broad agreement on “the one true” definition of international competitiveness is most 
likely impossible to reach, it is the responsibility of each national government to design its own 
definition of the concept and craft an economic agenda consisting of policies aimed at improving 
their country’s specific competitiveness conditions. International competitive is an inherently 
political concept, and as such policy makers and policy supervising institutions should consider 
writing recommendations tailored to different countries’ economic characteristics and 
investment/developmental needs and wants. Ultimately, countries might become competitive 
(whatever this means) by investing in underdeveloped areas or taking advantage of those 
sectors/activities/resources at which they have a comparative advantage, differentiating 
themselves and their products from those of other nations, not by mimicking policies which 
worked well in addressing general labor-market issues (not even necessarily competitiveness) in 
other nations (but only due to those nations’ specific economic environments). Thus far, however, 
to increase countries’ competitiveness these institutions have mostly advocated for 
decentralization of wage-setting mechanisms, based on how successful decentralization was in 
reducing Germany’s unemployment.  
 
The historical prevalence of the rationale that lower wages imply cheap exports, which in 
turn mean higher net exports has greatly influenced institutions like the IMF, the EU Commission 
and the ECB. Nonetheless, several countries constitute counterexamples to the widely accepted 
view that decentralization of wage-setting mechanisms leads to higher net exports, Belgium being 
the particular case analyzed in this paper. Belgium’s wage evolution after centralization of wage-
setting mechanisms is proof that country idiosyncrasies are an important factor affecting economic 
policies’ efficiency and that unconventional policy routes (wage-bargaining centralization for 
example) can be just as beneficial as conventional ones. Rather than advocating that centralized 
wage-setting increases exports or that decentralization is inefficient, this paper aims at questioning 
the definition of competitiveness itself and argues that establishing straightforward causal chains 
between wage-setting mechanisms and exports is erroneous. Consequently, national governments 
as well as EU institutions would probably benefit from incorporating directives targeted at 
improving more general economic factors other than wages in their policy packages, namely 
research and innovation, technology, and product quality and differentiability.          
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